APPLICATION OF THE VAGUENESS
DOCTRINE TO STATUTES
TERMINATING PARENTAL
RIGHTS
Few people would deny the importance of the right to have a fam-

ily and to raise children. These parental rights are among the most
basic rights of our society and go to the very heart of our social structure. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right of fam-

ily integrity is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.I That
this right is not absolute-that situations exist in which it is necessary
to sever the parent-child relationship-is also widely recognized. 2 To-

day every state has a statute permitting termination of parental rights
3
upon findings of inadequate care or treatment of children.
These statutes were developed to protect children's interests.4 The

original rationale for such statutes was the concept of parens patriae
(literally, "parent of the country"5 ), which refers to the power of the
state to act as a parent to protect the interests of persons unable to
protect themselves adequately. 6 While the doctrine was originally applied to idiots, lunatics, and other handicapped individuals needing
care, its use gradually spread to the care of neglected and abused children still in their parents' custody. The doctrine eventually became the
7
basis for permitting termination of parental rights.

"Parental termination" statutes today contain various standards,
1. See notes 18-29 infra and accompanying text.
2. See text accompanying notes 14-17 infra.
3. For a listing of state statutes relating to termination of parental rights, see Levine, FoundationsforDraftinga Model Statute to TerminateParentalRights 4 Select Bibliography,26 Juv.
JUST. 42, 54-56 (1975). For a full listing of state statutes relating to child abuse and neglect, see
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. Children's Bureau, Administration for Children, Youth and Families, Office of Human Development Services & U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Child Abuse and Neglect." State Reporting Laws, in THE ABUSED AND
NEGLECTED CHILD MULTI-DISCIPLINARY COURT PRACTICE app. 591, 622-25 (1978).
4. See Thomas, ChildAbuse and Neglect; Part P HistoricalOverview, Legal Matrix, and
SocialPerspectives, 50 N.C.L. REV. 293 (1972).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).

6. P.

CONNELL, J.. GANOUSIS, P. PIERSMA,

H. SWANGER, & A.

VOLENIK, LAW AND TACTICS

IN JUVENILE CASES 346 (3d ed. 1977).

7. See Areen, Intervention Between Parentand Child- 4 Reappraisalof the State'r Role in
ChildNeglect andAbuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 894-917 (1975); Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and
After the Entrance of "ParensPatriae," 22 S.C.L. REV. 147 (1970); Rendleman, ParensPatriae:

From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205 (1971).
Recent cases seldom mention this doctrine when considering the constitutionality of parental
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procedures, and other provisions. 8 They all, however, have the basic
objective of protecting the interests of the child. The significance of
these statutes is demonstrated by the great number of abused and neglected children. There are an estimated 800,000 cases of child neglect
yearly, as well as an estimated 200,000 cases of physical abuse. 9 These
incidents result in the death of an estimated 2,000 children each year.' 0
Although only approximately one-third to one-half of these estimated
cases are reported, I t one can readily see that parental termination statutes may be applied in a significant number of cases. Because of the
number of potential cases and the importance of the rights involved, it
is not surprising that these statutes have been subject to numerous constitutional attacks.
One challenge raised increasingly in recent years is that parental
termination statutes are impermissibly vague and therefore deny the
parents due process of law. A "vagueness" challenge is based on the
claim that the words of the statute are not sufficiently definite to indicate what conduct is prohibited or required. This indefiniteness may
lead to the termination of parental rights without fair warning, or may
lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' 2 Consideration of
the vagueness challenge is difficult because of the complexities of the
vagueness doctrine and its varying application in different contexts.
This Comment will examine the application of the vagueness doctrine
to statutes terminating parental rights.13
termination statutes; the courts now normally speak in terms of a legitimate state interest in the
child's welfare. See text accompanying notes 14-17 infra.
8. See Areen, supra note 7, at 920-30. Distinctions relevant to the vagueness issue will be
considered in Part IV of this Comment.
The statutes terminating parental rights discussed here should be distinguished from statutes
that provide criminal penalties for abusing or harming children. For the purposes of this Comment, "termination of parental rights" or "child neglect" statutes are those that are civil and
merely provide for severance of the parent-child relationship. Consideration of criminal "child
abuse" statutes is beyond the scope of this Comment.
In addition, the statutory sections involved in this Comment relate only to permanent termination of parental rights, and should be distinguished from provisions permitting temporary separation. Different considerations are involved in temporary separations. See Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Chi/dreL 4 Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 985, 988 (1975).
9. THE ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILD, supra note 3, at 27, 35.

10. Id
11. Id 14.
12. See notes 74-78 infra and accompanying text.
13. See generally Day, Termination of ParentalRights Statutes and the Voidfor Vagueness
Doctrine." A4Success/u/4ttack on the ParensPatriaeRationale, 16 J. FAM. L. 213 (1978); Levine,
supra note 3, at 42-46.
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THE RIGHTS INVOLVED AND THE STATE'S INTEREST IN
REGULATION

A. Legitimate State Interest.
It is universally accepted that a state has a legitimate interest in
protecting the welfare of children. As previously noted, the authority
of the state to interfere in family matters originally stemmed from the
concept of parens patriae. 14 The Supreme Court has also expressly recognized the right of a state to interfere in the parent-child relationship,
if necessary to protect the child. In Prince v. Massachusetts,'5 the Court
upheld an anti-child labor statute against the claim that it unreasonably infringed upon the parents' right to educate their child. In Stanley
v. Illinois,16 the Court struck down an Illinois statute depriving unmarried fathers of the custody of their children upon the death of the childrens' mothers, but acknowledged that a state not only had a right to
7
protect minor children, but also had the duty to do so.1
B.

FundamentalRight.

Translating the legitimate state interest into measures to protect
the welfare of children, however, is complicated by the fact that the
right to have and raise a family-or the right to family integrity-is
generally recognized as a "fundamental right"' 8 protected from state
infringement by the fourteenth amendment. This recognition
originated in a series of Supreme Court opinions considering matters
relating to the family and the raising of children. A number of these
cases hold that "family" rights are constitutionally protected through
the concept of liberty. The leading case of Meyer v. Nebraska,19 upheld
the right of parents to have their children taught German, by striking
down a statute that prohibited teaching young children any language
but English. The Court held that the concept of liberty in the fourteenth amendment not only refers to physical 'restraint but also
"[w]ithout doubt.

. .

denotes.

. .

the right of the individual to...

marry, establish a home, and bring up children ....

,,2o This notion

14. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
15. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

16. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
17. Id at 649.
18. The term, "fundamental right", refers to specific types of rights that are entitled to a high

level of protection. Statutes limiting fundamental rights are given more careful scrutiny for constitutional validity than statutes limiting other rights. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
19. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
20. Id at 399.
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was reiterated later in such cases as Pierce v. Society of Sisters,2 1 Skin23
ner v. Oklahoma,22 and Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur.
The right to family integrity has also been identified as an element
of the right of privacy. In Stanley v. Illinois,24 the Supreme Court, recognizing the protected right of privacy, acknowledged that "the integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment. '25 In Roe v.
Wade, 26 the Court, while considering abortion issues, again discussed
the concept of privacy and expressly acknowledged that the guarantee

of privacy includes such matters as procreation, family relationships,
and child rearing. Several other cases have similarly applied the pri-

27
vacy doctrine to matters concerning family integrity.

Statutes affecting fundamental rights are generally subject to
stricter constitutional scrutiny. 28 Thus, courts examining vagueness
challenges to these parental termination statutes must keep in mind the
29
fundamental nature of the parental rights involved.
21. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute requiring all children to attend public schools held invalid as
unreasonable interference with parents' liberty).
22. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute allowing sterilization of habitual criminals invalidated; recognition of fundamental nature of right to marry and procreate).
23. 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (provisions requiring mandatory leave for pregnant school teachers
held to interfere impermissibly with family decisions). See also Roe v. Con, 417 F. Supp. 769,
777 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 15-16 (S.D. Iowa 1975), af'din
.part,545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 335-37, 383 A.2d 1228, 1234-35,
cert. denied 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
24. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
25. Id at 651 (citations omitted).
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (aw prohibiting persons from distributing
contraceptives held to violate fundamental human rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (statute forbidding use of contraceptives abridged right of privacy protected by Constitution).
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See note 18 supra.
29. The presence of a fundamental right also has significance for the related attack based on
substantive due process. Many parents have argued that because a fundamental right is involved,
the state must show a compelling state interest and construe the statute narrowly to allow termination only when necessary to achieve this interest. See Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala.
1976); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), a 'dinpart,545 F.2d 1137 (8th
Cir. 1976); In re Carl N., 91 Misc. 2d 738, 398 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Fam. Ct. 1977); In re William L., 477
Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Sanchez v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1979). The statutes thus can violate the parents' due process rights
by allowing termination when there is not a sufficient state interest, or, put another way, when the
threshold of harm to the child necessary to activate the statute is not severe enough to justify
intereference with the fundamental right to family integrity.
This attack has generally received the same treatment as the vagueness challenge in cases
considering both issues. While a vague statute may also permit termination when there is not a
compelling state interest, this similarity of results is not necessarily due to the similarity between
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CHALLENGES TO PARENTAL TERMINATION STATUTES

A. Alsager v. District Court.
The first case in which a vagueness challenge to a child neglect
statute was successfully raised was A/sager v. District Court20 The federal district court hearing that case determined that the Iowa statute
providing for termination of parental rights was unconstitutionally
vague both as applied and on its face.31 The pertinent sections of the
challenged termination statute provided that the court could terminate
the parent-child relationship upon a finding "[tihat the parents have
substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused to give the child
the necessary parental care and protection, ' 32 or upon a finding "[t]hat
the parents are unfit by reason of. . . conduct found by the court likely
to be detrimental to the physical or mental health or morals of the
child."'33 The court declared these standards unconstitutionally vague
because they failed to provide fair warning, gave too much discretion
to those enforcing the statute, and deterred the parents from constitutionally protected conduct.3 4 Although the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit expressly refrained from affirming on vagueness
grounds, 35 the success of these challenges in the district court started a
barrage of similar attacks on parental termination statutes of other
states. Indeed, a great many of the subsequent opinions considering
36
this challenge discuss the decision of the district court in Alsager.
the challenges. There are different determinations to be made in each of the two attacks. The
similarity in results can, however, perhaps be explained to some extent by the approach of the
court or the consideration given to the various interests involved. This possibility is considered in
relation to the vagueness doctrine in Part IV E.
30. 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), af'dinpart, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
31. Id. For a discussion of the distinction between a vagueness challenge to a statute "on its
face" and "as applied," see note 62 infra and text accompanying notes 62-73 infra.
In addition, the court held that the statute denied the parents substantive due process by
providing for termination when a compelling state interest did not exist. 406 F. Supp. at 21-24. It
also determined that the parents' procedural due process rights were violated by failure to provide
adequate notice of the termination proceedings and by using a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard of proof. Id at 24-25.
32. 406 F. Supp. at 14 (citing IowA CODE § 232Al(2)(b) (1975)).
33. 406 F. Supp. at 14 (citing IowA CODE § 232.41(2)(d) (1975)).
34. See text accompanying notes 74-82 infra.
35. Since the decision could be affirmed on the basis of the substantive and procedural due
process violations, the court of appeals held that the vagueness challenge did not require resolution at that time. The court pointed out the seriousness of such a challenge and noted that failure
to affirm on these grounds would provide the Iowa courts with an opportunity to limit or define
the statute appropriately by construction. Alsager v. District Court, 545 F.2d 1137, 1138 (8th Cir.
1976). For a consideration of limiting decisions, see text accompanying notes 137-49 infra.
36. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112,
583 S.W.2d 37 (1979); In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976); In re
Hochmuth, 251 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1977); In re J.L.B., Mont. - , 594 P.2d 1127 (1979); In

Vol. 1980:336]

B.

PARENTAL RIGHTS STATUTES

Pre-Alsager Challenges.

Although A/sager was the impetus for subsequent vagueness challenges to termination statutes, courts in several earlier cases had addressed such a challenge. The most notable of these earlier cases was

State v. McMaster.37 The Oregon statute challenged in that case pro-

vided for termination of parental rights if the parents were found to be

"unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the
child."'38 Although a majority of the Oregon Supreme Court rejected
the vagueness attack essentially on policy grounds, 39 a concurring opinion by Justice Tongue agreed with the parents that the statute was unconstitutionally vague since it failed to provide adequate notice of the
40
conduct involved and gave too much discretion to juvenile courts.

Other cases prior to Alsager reached results similar to that of the
majority in McMaster.4' These cases upheld statutes allowing termina-

tion of parental rights upon findings that a child was "without proper
parental care or control," 42 that the child was in an environment "inju-

rious to his welfare,"'43 or that a parent had "engaged in conduct which

endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." 44 Most of

these cases reached a conclusion of constitutionality on a simple finding
that the standard was sufficiently definite or had a sufficiently common

to parents the conduct for which parental rights
meaning to indicate 45
might be terminated.
C.

Post-Alsager Challenges.
As noted above, the vast majority of the vagueness challenges have

been raised since the Alsager decision. Most of the courts considering
these challenges have not, however, followed the decision of the district
court in41sager.46 Many of the courts. citing or discussing A/sager have
re Keyes, 574 P.2d 1026 (Okla.), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 804 (1978); Sanchez v. Texas Dep't of
Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1979).
37. 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971).
38. Id at 293, 486 P.2d at 568.
39. See text accompanying notes 152-59 infra.
40. 259 Or. at 304, 486 P.2d at 577 (Tongue, J., concurring).
41. See, e.g., People v. Ladewig, 34 111. App. 3d 393, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1975); In re Cager, 251
Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968); In re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971); In re D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 237
N.W.2d 166 (1975).
42. In re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27, 36 (N.D. 1971).
43. In re D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 237 N.W.2d 166 (1975).
I
v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
44. D 45. See text accompanying notes 108-21 infra.
46. The subsequent cases in Iowa provide an interesting illustration. Following the refusal of
the court of appeals to affirm on vagueness grounds, the Iowa Supreme Court had an opportunity
in In re Hochmuth, 251 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1977), to address a vagueness challenge to the same
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attempted to distinguish that decision through the existence of limiting
constructions provided by prior decisions, 47 the wording of the standard,48 or the procedure required by the statute.49 In addition, some of
the cases have implied that the reasoning of the court in Alsager is
unsatisfactory.50 A number of other cases not directly discussing A/sager also have upheld the constitutionality of the statute, based upon
5
similar findings. '
At least two subsequent decisions, however, followed the A/sager
holding and held a termination statute unconstitutionally vague. In
Roe v. Conn, 52 an Alabama statute provided that parental rights could
be terminated upon a finding that the child was a "neglected child,"
which was defined as "any child, who, while under sixteen years of age
. . . has no proper parental care or guardianship or whose home, by
reason of neglect, cruelty, or depravity, on the part of his parent or
parents. . . is an unfit or improper place for such child. '5 3 The Alabama district court, expressly adopting the reasoning of Alsager, remarked that "not only is the statutory definition of neglect circular (a
neglected child is any child who has no proper parental care by reason
of neglect), but it is couched in terms that have no common meaning." 54 The statute was also declared unconstitutional on several other
grounds, including violation of procedural due process and overbreadth. 55
section of the statute challenged in A/sager. In that case the court held that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the parent challenging the statute. In the later case of In re
Ponx, 276 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1979), the court, in a ruling directly conflicting with A/sager, held
that the challenged section was not unconstitutionally vague on its face.
47. See, e.g., In re J.F.C., 577 P.2d 1"300, 1302 (Okla. 1978); In re William L., 477 Pa. 322,
331-34, 383 A.2d 1228, 1232-33, cert. denied 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
48. See, e.g., In re Five Minor Children, 407 A.2d 198 (Del. 1979), prob.juris. noted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980); Sanchez v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d
260, 267 (Tex. 1979).
49. See, e.g., In re Keyes, 574 P.2d 1026, 1028-29 (Okla.), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 804
(1978); In re William L, 477 Pa. 322, 331-34, 383 A.2d 1228, 1232-33, cert. denied 439 U.S. 880
(1978).
50. See, e.g., In re Keyes, 574 P.2d at 1029; Sanchez v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 581
S.W.2d at 267.
Mont. 51. See, e.g., Inre Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860 (D.C. 1977); In re J.L.B., -594 P.2d 1127 (1979); In re D.L.H., 198 Neb. 444, 253 N.W.2d 283 (1977); In re Carl N., 91
Misc. 2d 738, 398 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Fam. Ct. 1977).
52. 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
53. Id at 778-79 (quoting ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1958)).
54. 417 F. Supp. at 780.
55. Closely related to attacks for vagueness are challenges for overbreadth. Although often
difficult to separate, these two challenges involve two distinct concepts. Vagueness essentially
refers to how clearly defined the statute is-whether it is definite enough to indicate what conduct
is prohibited or required. Overbreadth, on the other hand, refers to the reach of a statute, and
frequently has been raised in a first amendment setting. A statute has been defined as overbroad
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The recent case of Davis v. Smith 5 6 similarly sustained a vagueness
challenge to an Arkansas parental termination statute. The statute pro-

vided that termination could occur upon a finding that the parents did
not provide "a proper home. ' 57 The Arkansas Supreme Court, after
considering the fundamental interest involved and the appropriate test

to be used,58 relied on both Conn and Alsager in holding the statute
unconstitutionally vague. The discretion left to the judge in ruling on

termination was "so broad that arbitrary and discriminatory parental
terminations [were] inevitable." 59
III.

VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

Examining parental termination statutes for impermissible vagueness is difficult not only because of the varying wording, operation,
construction, and application of the statutes, 60 but also because of the
complexities of the vagueness doctrine itself.6 1 It is not clear just how
the vagueness doctrine is to be applied. Before reaching the merits of a
case, courts first have had to consider both the permissible extent of the
vagueness challenge and the test to be used.
A.

The Extent of the Vagueness Challenge.

One of the most difficult questions concerning the vagueness doctrine is whether parents, when challenging a statute on vagueness

grounds, may challenge it only as applied to them or whether they may
also challenge the statute on its face.6 2 The distinction between vague-

"if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 114 (1972). The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that vagueness and overbreadth are two distinct problems. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 621 n.5 (1976);
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577 n.20 (1974).
A tendency exists, however, to raise both claims when challenging the constitutionality of a
standard used in a statute, since a vague statute may be overbroad as well. The fate of the overbreadth attack on parental termination statutes has generally been the same as that of the vagueness challenge. See Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Alsager v. District
Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 21-24 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (considering improper reach of statute in relation
to claim of violation of substantive due process), af'd inpart, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); In re
Keyes, 574 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Okla.), appealdismissed,439 U.S. 804 (1978); State v. McMaster, 259
Or. 291, 299-300, 486 P.2d 567, 570-71 (1971).
56. 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).
57. Id. at -, 583 S.W.2d at 40 (quoting ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128(2)(h) (Supp. 1979)).
583 S.W.2d at 40-42. See notes 74-96 infra and accompanying text.
58. 266 Ark. at-,
59. 266 Ark. at-,
583 S.W.2d at 44.
60. Such factors are considered in Part IV.
61. See Note, The oidfor-Vagueness Doctrinein the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960).
Mont. 62. Compare,e.g., In re Hochmuth, 251 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1977); In re J.L.B., -, 594 P.2d 1127 (1979); andIn re Carl N., 91 Misc. 2d 738, 398 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Fain. Ct. 1977) (all
of which consider the vagueness challenge only as applied), with Alsager v. District Court, 406 F.
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ness attacks as applied and those on the face of a statute is not entirely

clear. A vagueness challenge to a statute as applied requires considering whether the harms resulting from the vagueness 63 occur in the par-

ticular case at hand. What an attack for vagueness on the face of a
statute entails is not apparent. 64 A literal reading suggests that a facial
attack simply requires an examination of the statute for vagueness
without regard to possible limiting interpretations or specific applications. Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, construe facial at-

tacks for vagueness as presenting the question whether the statute may
be vague as hypothetically applied to others.65 At least one court has

determined that for a statute to be unconstitutionally66vague on its face,
it must be vague in every conceivable state of facts.
In Parker v. Levy, 67 the Supreme Court concluded that a person
whose conduct clearly falls within the requirements of a statute may
not challenge the statute for vagueness as applied to others.6 8 Accord-

ingly, if a parental termination statute clearly applies to the conduct of
the parents raising the challenge, those parents should not be entitled to
challenge the statute on the basis that it is overly vague as to other
parents.6 9 Yet situations may exist in which such consideration of the
statute as applied to others is appropriate. Such a situation exists when
Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), a#'dinpart,545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); In re J.F.C., 577 P.2d 1300
(Okla. 1978); andIn re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cer. denied 439 U.S. 880 (1978)
(which also consider the facial validity of the statutes).
63. See text accompanying notes 76-78 infra.
64. See Note, supra note 61, at 109 n.224.
65. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752-61 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 576-78
(1974).
66. The Iowa Supreme Court adopts this position in In re Lewis, 257 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Iowa
1977). See In re Ponx, 276 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Iowa 1979).
67. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
68. Id at 755-56.
69. Even though the statute clearly applies to the claimant, he might be permitted to attack
the facial validity of the statute on the closely related grounds of overbreadth if the court determines that the statute causes other persons to refrain from constitutionally protected conduct.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 58-61 (1976). Such attacks, however, have
generally been limited to the first amendment area. The appropriateness of allowing an overbreadth attack depends on whether the reasons justifying an overbreadth attack in the first amendment context also apply in the context of parental rights termination statutes. While both contexts
involve important rights protected by the Constitution, the main justification for allowing facial
attacks on statutes concerning first amendment freedoms-that the existence of a vague and overbroad statute will inhibit others in the exercise of their first amendment rights-is not present with
similar force in the case of parental termination statutes. Even if parents are presumed to know
the law, United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427,438 (1896), they are not apt to refrain from any
constitutionally protected conduct in an attempt to comply with an overbroad parental termination statute. Although the parents know that their parental rights may be terminated upon a
finding that they are not providing "proper parental care" (or some similar general standard of
care), they are likely to believe that the care they are providing is proper and that they will not be
affected by such a standard. Those actions from which parents are likely to refrain for fear of
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the claimant's conduct is so indistinguishable from other behavior
sought to be regulated by the statute that considering the statute as applied to him would in essence be considering the statute as it would be
applied to others. 70 The presence of such a situation in this context is
doubtful. Parental termination statutes cover a wide range of possible
conduct, and it is possible to draw meaningful distinctions between the
behavior in one case and all other types of behavior sought to be regulated by these statutes. It also might be necessary to consider the facial
validity of a statute if the statute were so vague as to provide no standard at all.7 1 Such a statute would necessarily be vague as to all against
whom it is applied, including the particular person challenging the statute. Parental termination statutes do not, however, seem to be so vague
as to provide no standard at all. Even a standard such as "a proper
intelligence with at least
home" would provide a person of ordinary
72
some understanding of what is required.
Whether the challenge attacks the statute as it is applied, or on its
face, or both, is unlikely in practice to affect the outcome significantly. 73 Since a facially vague statute would be vague to the claimant
as well, the determining factor will still be whether the statute is vague
as applied to the claimant.
B.

The ProperTest.

Courts adjudicating vagueness challenges have also had to determine what standard to apply. This is significant since the standard employed might actually control the determination of the vagueness issue,
and since the courts are not in agreement as to the most appropriate
standard.
1. The Grayned Test. The Grayned test, used in Alsager and by
several other courts since then,74 originated in the case of Grayned v.
losing their parental rights will probably be so extremely detrimental to the child as to be unprotected.
70. Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 93 (1st Cir. 1972), af'd,415 U.S. 566 (1974).
71. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614

(1971).
72. See text accompanying notes 126-29 infra. The court in Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37, 43 (1979), nonetheless found that the ambiguities in the word "proper" rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague.
73. This assumes, of course, that the court would not permit a facial attack when the statute
was clearly not vague as applied. See note 69 supra.
74. See In re J.F.C., 577 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Okla. 1978); In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 330-31,
383 A.2d 1228, 1232, cert. denied 439 U.S. 880 (1978). Other courts have cited Grayned,although
they did not expressly discuss the Grayned test or its use in the case. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F.
-,
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City of Rockford.75 In that case, a man who had been convicted of
violating an antinoise ordinance claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, as well as overbroad. The court stated that vague
laws cause three important harms. First, they "may trap the innocent
by not providing fair warning.

' 76

Second, "[a] vague law impermissi-

bly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. ' 77 Finally, a vague
law may cause people to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone'...
than if the boundaries of the forbidden area were clearly marked. ' 78
In requiring consideration of all three dangers, the Grayned test is
the most stringent of the vagueness standards normally used: a finding
of unconstitutionality results if only one danger actually exists. Most
claimants, of course, would want the courts to use this standard in deciding their vagueness challenges.
The Alsager court justified use of this standard both because a fundamental right was involved and because the Alsagers claimed that
their first amendment freedom of association was threatened. 79 The
court reasoned that since a fundamental right was involved, the standard used for the important first amendment rights would be appropriate. As discussed below, 80 the only actual difference between this
standard and others commonly used is the express consideration of the
third element-the danger that a vague child neglect statute will restrain parents from engaging in some constitutionally protected conduct. The likelihood of a parental termination statute having this kind
of effect appears slim. 8 1 A full and adequate consideration of the
vagueness attack therefore would not require use of the "three danger"
Grayned test.82
583 S.W.2d 37, 42 (1979);
Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, -,
Sanchez v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 260, 266 (Tex. 1979).
75. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).

76. Id at 108.
77. Id at 108-09.

78. Id at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958))).
The Court concluded that none of the three dangers was present inthe ordinance involved,
and therefore rejected the vagueness attack. The overbreadth challenge was also rejected.
79. 406 F. Supp. 10, 18 n.5 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'dinpart, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
In reference to the Alsagers' right to freedom of association, the court cited Griswold v. Con-

necticut, 381 U.S. 479,482-83 (1965), but did not discuss how that right applied to the parent-child
relationship.
80. See notes 83-96 infra and accompanying text.
81. See note 69 supra.
82. This conclusion assumes that a state constitution or state law will not be interpreted as
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2. The Common Meaning Standard. The standard used most
often in vagueness challenges8 3 is whether the words of the statute have

a common meaning to persons of ordinary intelligence so as to inform
them of what is prohibited or required. A statute is vague if "men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as

to its application.

.

..

"84

This standard is primarily a specific, practi-

cal way of considering whether the statute provides fair warning or no-

tice to persons who may be affected by it,85 one of the three
considerations posed by the Grayned test.86 Consideration of whether

the statute gives enforcement officials and judges too much discretion,
conduct, may also be entertained
or inhibits constitutionally protected
87
under the common-meaning test.
3.

The Civil-CriminalDistinction. The vagueness issue is further

complicated by holdings indicating that a greater degree of specificity is
generally required of criminal statutes than of civil statutes, 88 even
though the common meaning standard applies to both.89 Several cases

addressing vagueness challenges to parental termination statutes have
considered this distinction. In Davis v. Smith, 90 the court concluded

that the vagueness test used should lie somewhere between the criminal

standard and the standard relating to business regulations. 91 In In re
Cager,92 however, a Maryland court concluded that the explicitness rerequiring stricter scrutiny of parental termination statutes for vagueness than the United States
Constitution requires.
83. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark.
112,-, 583 S.W.2d 37, 41 (1979); In re S.M., 39 Cal. App. 3d 40, 43, 113 Cal.Rptr. 847, 848-49
(1974); People v. Ladewig, 34 Ill. App. 3d 393, 397, 340 N.E.2d 150, 153 (1975); In re Lewis, 257
N.W.2d 505, 510 (Iowa 1977); In re D.L.H., 198 Neb. 444, 448-49,253 N.W.2d 283, 286 (1977); In
re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27, 35-36 (N.D. 1971); State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 299-300, 486 P.2d 567,
571 (1971); In re D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 596, 237 N.W.2d 166, 169 (1975); Sanchez v. Texas Dep't of
Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 260, 266 (Tex. 1979).
84. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
85. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1951).
86. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
87. Thus, although categorized as a separate standard here because its use generally entails
merely a consideration of the fair warning or notice element of a statute, this standard may actually be used along with the Grayned test to determine if any of the three harms exists.
88. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, - , 583 S.W.2d 37, 41 (1979).
89. The widely-used common meaning standard developed in a criminal context, see, e.g.,
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), and has been applied to noncriminal statutes as well, see, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1951). See generally Annot., 40
L. Ed. 2d 823 (1975).
90. 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).
91. Id at -,

583 S.W.2d at 42.

92. 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968).
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quired of a criminal statute was appropriate. 93 The precise distinction
between the standard for criminal statutes and that for business regulations and other civil statutes is itself unclear. The distinction apparently grew out of an examination of past cases considering vagueness
attacks on various statutes, and may be explained by the courts having
focused on different potential harms, depending on whether the statute
in question was criminal or civil. For example, the United States
Supreme Court in Papachristouv. City ofJacksonville,94 in considering
a vagueness attack on a criminal vagrancy ordinance, placed significant
emphasis on lack of notice and unbridled discretion in enforcement officials. 95 Thus, the "stricter" requirement for criminal statutes may be
a requirement that the court give greater consideration to these two
96
possible harms.
4. Summary. The only certainty is that there is much vagueness
in the vagueness doctrine itself. The best approach to a challenge on
grounds of vagueness is to consider whether substantial vagueness dangers are likely to arise from the facts in issue, and then to examine the
statute to determine whether it fosters these dangers. The common
meaning standard should be used to determine the presence of such
harms in the particular case at issue. With parental rights termination
statutes, the lack of fair warning and impermissible delegation of discretion are both significant and must be considered by the courts.97
IV.
A.

EXAMINATION OF THE CASES

Effect of the Test Applied on the Ultimate Success of the
Challenge.

Courts have applied various standards in considering vagueness
challenges to parental termination statutes. The cases do not clearly
demonstrate, however, that the differences in results can be attributed
to the different standards applied.
Consider first the courts applying the Grayned test. The Alsager
court determined that the statute involved gave rise to all three dangers: absence of fair warning, impermissible delegation of discretion,
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id at 481, 248 A.2d at 389.
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
Id at 162, 168.
Such a standard thus would be less "strict" than the Graynedtest used in a first amend-

ment context.
97. These possible dangers are particularly important because of the fundamental nature of
the rights involved. See notes 18-29 supra and accompanying text.
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and inhibition of the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 98
While the Graynedtest is apparently a strict test, other cases specifically
using it, such as In re JFC.99 and In re William L. 100, do not reach

similar results. Both of these cases simply deny the presence of each of
the three harms, either on the basis of prior opinions 0 1 or by distin02
guishing in some manner the statute involved or its operation.1

Most courts rejecting the vagueness challenge have used the com-

mon meaning test and have upheld the statutes on a simple finding that
the words of each statute did indeed have a common meaning, or that

persons of ordinary intelligence would not have to guess at their meaning.103 The use of this standard makes it easier for courts desiring to
uphold a statute-or desiring at least to uphold its application to the

facts in issue-to reach a finding of constitutionality. 104 Merely avoiding explicit considerations of the possible Grayned dangers cannot,
however, fully explain the differing results. Both Roe v. Conn'0 5 and
Davis v. Smith,10 6 two cases that found statutes unconstitutionally
vague, used the common meaning test. 107 Due to the limited number
of cases, one cannot draw definite conclusions about the effect that use

of a particular vagueness standard has on the ultimate resolution of a
case. Clearly, however, the standard selected does not afford a complete explanation for the final success or failure of the challenge.
B.

Varying Statutory Standards.
Although the statutes themselves provide a variety of standards for

parental conduct, it is difficult to distinguish the cases only on that basis. Courts considering very similar standards of conduct have reached
98. 406 F. Supp. at 18-19.
99. 577 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1978).
100. 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
101. See notes 137-49 infra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 108-3.6 infra and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., In re S.M., 39 Cal. App. 3d 40, 113 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1974); In re Cager, 251 Md.
473, 481, 248 A.2d 384, 389 (1968); In re D.L.H., 198 Neb. 444, 448, 253 N.W.2d 283, 286 (1977);
In re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27, 35-36 (N.D. 1971); State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 298-301, 486 P.2d
567, 570-71 (1971); In re D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 595-96, 237 N.W.2d 166, 169 (1975); McGowen v.
State, 558 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
104. This might occur when the statute could not logically withstand a vagueness challenge,
but the court for policy reasons would not want to hold the statute unconstitutional. In such cases
a simple finding of a common meaning would seem to be much easier than a showing that the
three harms of Grayned were not present.
105. 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
106. 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).
107. While both of these cases rely heavily on the .41sager holding and cite Grayned, neither of
them expressly considers the Grayned dangers and both appear to rely solely on the common
meaning test.
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different results about whether the words of the statutes lack a common
meaning and thus whether the statutes are unconstitutionally vague.
The A1sager court determined that the standards of "'necessary
parental care and protection' . . . [and] 'conduct . . .detrimental to
the physical or mental health . . of the child' . . . [were] susceptible

to multifarious interpretations which prevent the ordinary person from
knowing what is and is not prohibited."' 10 8 Yet a subsequent decision
by an Iowa state court held that "men of common intelligence would
deduce that 'necessary parental care and protection' would encompass,
at a minimum, providing a clean living environment and proper personal hygiene, health care and diet for the children."' 0 9 Thus, the Iowa
court believed that the words of the statute did have a sufficiently common meaning to survive a vagueness challenge.
Other courts have agreed with the Iowa court when considering
similar statutes. In In re D.T,110 the South Dakota Supreme Court
held that phrases such as "lacks proper parental care" and "whose environment is injurious to his welfare""' conveyed a "sufficiently definite warning as to proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. ' 12 These are standards that the "average
intelligent person can understand and from which he can regulate his
14
conduct.""13 The North Dakota court, in In re JZ,'
held that the
standard "without proper parental care or control""l 5 has a meaning
that is "plain and not subject to varying impressions of those attempting to comply with the statutes and those attempting to enforce the
laws." 116 Likewise, the Oklahoma court in In re Keyes 117 held that the
standard of "parental care or protection necessary for his physical or
mental health""18 had a sufficiently common meaning. In In re William
L.,19 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that the meaning of
the standard, "essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary
108. 406 F. Supp. 10, 18 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (citations omitted), aft'd inpart, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th

Cir. 1976).
109. In re Ponx, 276 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Iowa 1979).
110. 89 S.D. 590, 237 N.W.2d 166 (1975).
111. Id at 585, 237 N.W.2d at 168 (citing S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
phasis omitted).
112. 89 S.D. at 596, 237 N.W.2d at 169.
113. Id
114. 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971).
115. Id at 30 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(5) (1974)).
116. 190 N.W.2d at 36.
117. 574 P.2d 1026 (Okla.), appealdismissed, 439 U.S. 804 (1978).
118. 574 P.2d at 1028 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (1971)).
119. 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied 439 U.S. 880 (1978).

§ 26-8-6

(1976)) (em-
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for his physical or mental well-being,"1 20 was sufficiently clear to defeat
12 1
a vagueness challenge.
Nonetheless, the district court in Roe v. Conn' 22 concluded that the
standard of "no proper parental care or guardianship or whose home,
by reason of neglect, cruelty, or depravity on the part of his parent...
is an unfit and improper place for such child,"' 23 had no common
meaning. Similarly, the words "a proper home" were held in Davis v.
125
Smith 124 not to have a common meaning.
Although there are slight differences in the statutory standards in
each case, for the purpose of determining whether they have a common
meaning the statutes are indistinguishable. Do the words of these statutes actually lack a common meaning? Can the average parent understand what is required and conform his conduct to meet the
requirements?
Although these are seemingly straightforward questions, they are
not easy to answer. Whether a standard has a meaning sufficiently
common to withstand a vagueness challenge depends in part upon the
type of conduct charged, whether the challenged statute is specific
about that particular conduct, and, generally, the degree of specificity
the courts will require. The best view, as indicated by the court in In re
Ponx, 26 is that such standards as "necessary parental care and protection" do indicate to a person of common intelligence at least the basic,
minimum care that virtually everyone would agree was necessary for a
child's well-being. 127 The difficulty arises in determining the specificity
required beyond these minimum requirements. Beyond the basic minimum, such standards probably do not have a common meaning to people of ordinary intelligence. They contain terms "about which men
and women of ordinary intelligence may disagree. Their answers
would vary in large measure in relation to their differing social, ethical,
and religious views."' 2 8 These statutes are obviously intended to include more than the bare minimum requirements; if not, the legisla120. 477 Pa. at 328 n.2, 383 A.2d at 1231 n.2 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311(2) (Purdon

Supp. 1978)).
121. This holding was partially based on prior decisions that the court construed as having
added some of the needed specificity. See notes 137-49 infra and accompanying text.
122. 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
123. Id at 773 n.1 (citing ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(2) (1958)).
124. 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).
, 583 S.W.2d at 39-40 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128(2)(h) (Supp. 1979)).
125. Id at 126. 276 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Iowa 1979).
127. Such a minimum would at least include "a clean living environment and proper personal
hygiene, health care and diet for the children." Id See also In re Metteer, 203 Neb. 515,
279 N.W.2d 374, 377 (1979).
128. In re Keyes, 574 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Okla.), appealdismissed, 439 U.S. 804 (1978).
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tures could simply list the basic minimum required. 29 The
determination whether the statute has a sufficiently definite common
meaning must therefore depend on considerations other than the mere
30
wording of the statute.'

C. Operation of the Statutes.
The termination procedure required by the statute may also affect

the validity of the vagueness challenge. The courts in In re Keyes 13'

and In re William L. 132 both distinguished their statutes from the Asager statute on this basis. The Oklahoma and Pennsylvania statutes

provided parents with an opportunity to correct deficiencies before permanent termination of their parental rights. 133 The sections challenged
in Alsager, however, did not contain such a provision; they provided
for termination merely upon a finding of neglect.134 Under the Pennsylvania and Oklahoma statutes, the claim that the parents were not
given fair warning of what conduct could result in termination is overcome by informing them of their neglect in time to correct it. 3 - This is
not the case under the Iowa statute. This procedural requirement
defeats only the lack-of-fair-warning danger of vague statutes; it cannot
129. This would not be too difficult a task. Such a listing at a minmum would include sufficient food, adequate shelter, necessary medical treatment, and freedom from physical abuse.

130. It should be noted that not all of the statutes challenged on vagueness grounds are quite
as general as those discussed here. Many of the statutes contain examples of the conduct that
could result in termination or a listing of factors to consider. For example, the statute in In re
Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968), contained a list of factors to be considered in determining if the parents had failed "to provide a stable moral environment." Id at 479, 248 A.2d at 388.
See also MONT. RaV. CODES ANN. § 41-3-102(a)-(b) (Supp. 1979) (the statute challenged in In re
J.L.B., Mont. - , 594 P.2d 1127 (1979), which gives examples of some of the necessities
required). Such statutes are certainly more apt to indicate what conduct or failures may result in
termination than those with the mere standard of "proper parental care."
131. 574 P.2d 1026 (Okla.), appealdismissed,439 U.S. 804 (1978).
132. 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
133. The Oklahoma statute required that a court find child neglect or mistreatment and find
that "the parent has failed to show that the conditions have been corrected within a period of six
(6) months after the child, or children were adjudged dependent or neglected." 574 P.2d at 1028
(citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (1971)). The Pennsylvania statute required that the "conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent." 477 Pa. at 328, n.2, 383 A.2d at 1231 n.2 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,§ 311(2) (Purdon
Supp. 1978)). The court in William L noted that very rarely will conditions be considered irremediable without first identifying the deficiencies to the parents and giving them an opportunity to
correct them. 477 Pa. at 332 n.5, 383 A.2d at 1232 n.5.
134. 406 F. Supp. 10, 14 (S.D. Iowa 1975), afdinpart,545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
135. This assumes that the notification of neglect given to the parents is specific enough to
indicate to the parent what deficiencies actually need correcting. If this notification were nothing
more than a rephrasing of a general statutory standard, then it would provide no more notice or
warning than the statute itself. The court in Keyes noted that in the original petition "both the
factual basis for termination and the legal standards permitting same were set forth clearly and
precisely." 574 P.2d at 1029.
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defeat the claim that the statute gave too much discretion to enforcement persons, judges, and juries. 136 Such a warning provision is thus
not necessarily a cure-all for an otherwise vague statute.
D.

Remedy By Decision.
13 7
As the Supreme Court indicated in Graynedv. City ofRockford,

it is permissible to examine prior state court opinions to determine if a
limiting or definite construction has been given to the statute. 138 The
Alsager court expressly acknowledged the consideration of restricting
interpretations in the context of termination of parental rights statutes:
[To be unconstitutionally vague, this determination in terms of the
facial defects of the statute is not necessarily fatal; the Court must
next determine whether this vagueness has been cured, either generally, by the Iowa Supreme Court's decisions in other termination
cases, or specifically, by the Iowa Supreme Court's opinion in this
case. .

.

. [T]he defect of an enactment's vagueness can be amelio-

the vague standards to
rated by a state court construction restricting
139
constitutionally permissible bounds.
of the Iowa
The court there, however, did not find any decisions
0
specificity.14
needed
the
provided
that
Supreme Court
Other courts have rejected the vagueness challenge to termination
statutes at least partially upon a finding of prior decisions that helped
limit or define the statute. 41 It is questionable, however, whether these
prior decisions actually provided the needed specificity. In In re William L. ,142 the Pennsylvania court, addressing a claim that the statute
43
created the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
held that prior decisions of the court protected against such application. 144 Prior decisions had stated that the parent-child relationship
136. Although the requirement that the parents be informed of the specific deficiencies might
help establish a more consistent interpretation of the statute, this would not significantly affect the
wide range of discretion given to judges and others under these general standards.
137. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
138. For other Supreme Court cases recognizing the effect of limiting construction by state
courts, see Annot., supra note 89, at 827.
139. 406 F. Supp. 10, 19 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (footnote omitted), af'dinpart,545 F.2d 1137 (8th
Cir. 1976).
140. Presumably if the required specificity had been supplied by the Iowa Supreme Court in
A/sager itself, the statute would be allowed to stand, but the termination of the Alsagers' parental
rights would not. The Alsagers would not have been given any prior notice or warning since the
vagueness still would have existed when their rights were terminated.
141. Eg., Inre Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976); Inre Carl N., 91 Misc.
2d 738, 398 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Fain. Ct. 1977); In re J.F.C., 577 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1978); In re William
L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, ceri. denied 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
142. 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cer. denied 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
143. This is the second danger of the Grayned test. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
144. 477 Pa. at 332, 383 A.2d at 1233. The challenged statute allowed termination when the
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could not be severed except upon a clear and convincing showing that
removal was necessary. 145 These decisions had held it insufficient
merely to show that the home was substandard or that the child might
be culturally deprived. Other decisions relied upon had held that the
parents' extended reliance upon others to care for the child was a factor
to be considered by the court, that a parent had a duty to work toward
return of a child placed in foster care, and that if there was some reasonable chance of correcting the deficiencies, termination would not be
ordered.146 The William L. court concluded that "the demanding standards of section 311(2), together with the Legislature's and this Court's
strong policy of restraint from interfering with the family, sufficiently
protect against the arbitrary and discriminatory application of section
311(2)."'

47

While such decisions do provide some additional guidance to
courts in considering termination, they do not contain the type of specificity sought in Grayned and Alsager. One means for evaluating the
specificity added by prior decisions is to read the statute as if it contained the pertinent interpretations of the prior decisions, and then to
subject this augmented statute to the same test that would be applied to
the base statute. Using such an approach, the standard in William L.
(assuming it was vague by itself) would probably not be cured by the
decisions mentioned by the court.'4 8 Decisions containing more specific interpretations of the statute are needed, not just holdings stating
149
basic policies concerning termination.
E.

Weighing of Interests.

An examination of the cases reveals that factors such as the wording of the statute, the procedure involved in termination, and the presence of prior interpretative decisions cannot fully account for the
differences in the results of the cases. The difference, rather, appears to
be rooted in the tendency of many courts to emphasize the rights of the
children rather than those of the parents. The courts have become conparents' neglect caused the child to be "without essential parental care, control, or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311(2) (Purdon Supp.

1978).
145. See, e.g., In re Adoption of R.I., 468 Pa. 287, 294, 361 A.2d 294, 297 (1976).
146. 477 Pa. at 332-34, 383 A.2d at 1233-34.
147. Id at 334, 383 A.2d at 1234.
148. Even assuming that the decisions noted above were read into the statute, the statute
would still
fail to provide adequate warning to parents and would allow for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
149. Seelnre Carl N., 91 Misc. 2d 738, 742 n.1, 398 N.Y.S.2d 613, 617 n.1 (Fam. Ct. 1977), in
which much of the judicial interpretation of the standard, "failure to plan for the future of the
child," was incorporated into a new statute.
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cerned not merely with whether the parents are being denied due process because of a vague statute, but also with the policy considerations
behind the termination statutes and the effect that their decision on the
vagueness issue will have on the other rights involved.
Probably the most significant ingredient in this emphasis is the underlying notion that a more definite or specific statute simply cannot be
drawn to protect the welfare of the child. 150 Courts adhering to this
view maintain that the general standards used in the statutes are essential to the legislative intent of protecting the child's interests.' 5' Consider, for example, the remarks of the Oregon court in State v.
McMaster,15 2 discussing whether the standard "unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child" was unconstitutionally vague:
In our opinion, to accomplish its primary purpose of caring for
the welfare of the child, the legislature would have extreme difficulty
being more specific. The legislature could specify certain conduct
upon the part of the parents which would cause them to be deprived
of their parental rights; however, that is not the intent of the legislature or of this court in interpreting this statute. The legislature and
this court do not desire to sever parental rights for any conduct by
unless such conduct seriously affects the child's welthe parents
53
fare.1
The court concluded that a general standard was necessary and that the
statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Other courts have reached
154
similar conclusions.
Having concluded that a less general statutory standard would not
adequately further the legislative intent of protecting the child, courts
have found precedent in several United States Supreme Court opinions
for rejecting the vagueness challenge. These opinions indicate that a
150. See In re Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860 (D.C. 1977); People v. Ladewig, 34 Il1. App.
, 594 P.2d 1127 (1979); In re D.L.H.,
Mont. 3d 393, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1975); In re J.L.B., 198 Neb. 444, 253 N.W.2d 283 (1977); In re Carl N., 91 Misc. 2d 738, 398 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Fam. Ct.
1977); State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971).
151. While a full consideration of this point is beyond the scope of this Comment, it should be

noted that this approach is far from universal. A number of proposed statutes contain standards
for termination of parental rights that are significantly more specific than those currently existing
in many states. See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS RELATING To ABUSE AND NEGLECT (Tent. Draft 1977); Katz, Freeing Childrenfor
PermanentPlacement Through a ModelAct, 12 FAM. L.Q. 203 (1978); Lincoln, Model Statutefor
Termination ofParentalRights, 27 Juv. JUST. 3 (1976); Note, Termination ofParentalRightsSuggestedRe/ormsandResponses, 16 J. FAM. L. 239 (1978). Such proposals suggest that the basic

assumption underlying many of these opinions-that statutes must employ general standards to
protect
152.
153.
154.

the child's interests-may be incorrect. See also Day, supra note 13, at 234-35, 237-38.
259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971).
Id at 298-99, 486 P.2d at 570.
See note 150 supra.
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statute need not be more specific than is possible under the circumstances, or that "impossible standards of specificity are not required."1 55 The courts, however, have not relied solely on this support;
rather, they have also concluded that the standard involved had a sufficiently common meaning.' 56 As discussed above, though, the determination whether a statutory phrase has a common meaning depends to a
great extent on the amount of specificity the courts will require of the
statute. The belief that a more specific standard could not accomplish
the legislative goal (protection of the child's welfare) will probably
lower the degree of specificity that a court will require, making more
57
likely a finding that the statute has a sufficiently common meaning.'
The court's concern for the interests of the child therefore becomes a
major, if not the major, factor in the final determination of whether the
statute is unconstitutionally vague.
In essence this determination is a matter of balancing. Many
courts have in effect balanced the parents' due process rights concerning matters of family integrity with the interests of the children in being
protected against neglect or abuse. As stated in State v. McMaster:t58
[Ulnlike criminal statutes in which the interests of only one set of
individuals is [sic] involved, the constitutional issue must be examined with the interests of both the child and the parents. What
might be unconstitutional if only the parents' rights were involved is
constitutional if the statute adopts legitimate and necessary means to
protect the child's interests.' 59
In In re Daniel H.,160 the Oklahoma court acknowledged that "[t]he
welfare of children is the primary concern of our juvenile code and in
balancing the rights of parents with those of their children, we believe
that the statutory provision in question is sufficiently precise to withstand appellant's vagueness attack."'16 Although not al courts formally acknowledge this balancing of interests, the strong consideration
given to the child's interests indicates that some weighing of these inter155. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951). See also United States v. Petrillo, 332

U.S. 1 (1947).
156. Such a finding is in fact required. Although both the Jordanand Pe/rillo decisions state
that impossible standards are not required, they hold that the Constitution does require that the

words provide a "sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices." 341 U.S. at 231-32; 332 U.S. at 8.
157. The flexibility of the "common meaning" standard is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 126-30 supra.
158. 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971).
159. Id at 296, 486 P.2d at 569.

160. 591 P.2d 1175 (Okla. 1979).
161. Id at 1177-78. While that case actually concerned only a decision on temporary separation, the statute involved related to permanent termination as well.
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ests occurs. 162

Is it proper to balance the rights of the child with those of the
parent? Should the determination of vagueness depend upon the interests of those protected by the statute? The Alsager court thought not:
"The Court is not presently concerned with the child's rights vis-A-vis
a substantial interthe parents, even though it realizes that a child has 163
est in being free from parental neglect and abuse."'
This finding certainly makes sense. The rights of the children are
not at issue; the parents are the ones who are claiming a denial of their
rights. The major concern in the case is an adjudication of their rights,
not the rights of others who have an interest in the outcome. If the
parents were raising a vagueness challenge to a business regulation or
even to a statute involving first amendment rights, such as an antiloudspeaker ordinance, it is doubtful that the interests of consumers or of
citizens on the streets would be the controlling factor in the vagueness
determination. On the other hand, courts cannot totally ignore practical and policy considerations in the present context; nor can they ignore
the likely effect of their decisions on those whom the statutes were
designed to protect. Courts must be aware of the ramifications of their
decisions and their probable effect both on legislative goals and the
rights of others. Although the rights of the parents are the primary
concern, some consideration should be given to the interests of the
child; the extent of that consideration thus becomes important to the
proper determination of parental termination statute challenges.
The child's interests protected by these statutes are extremely important' 64 and should be given some protection by the courts. Yet to
emphasize the protection of these interests over the rights of the parents
ignores several important considerations. First, the child's basic physical needs-adequate food, shelter, medical care, and freedom from
physical abuse-would not become unprotectable by sustaining a
vagueness challenge. A statute could be enacted that simply lists such
essentials and states that failure to provide them could result in termination of parental rights. It is the interests of the child in "necessities"
beyond this list that are most likely to be adversely affected by sus162. For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court in In re D.L.H., 198 Neb. 44,253 N.W.2d 283
(1977), commented: "It is true, the terms of the statutes are somewhat broad, yet it is practically
impossible to draw them with greater specificity and still adequately protect the dependent and
neglected child." d at 450, 253 N.W.2d at 287.
163. 406 F. Supp. 10, 16 n.3 (S.D. Iowa 1975), agffdin part, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
164. The importance of these interests might explain why the courts are apt to give more

weight to them in considering vagueness challenges than they give to the interests of those protected by other statutes.
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taining a vagueness challenge.' 65 These necessities are generally not as
essential as are the ones listed above, and people are much more likely
to disagree over the extent and manner in which they should be provided. Thus the loss to the child is not as certain as would initially
appear.
Second, such an approach loses sight of the original basis for the
vagueness challenge-that the parents are being deprived of their constitutional rights. This is the issue of the case, not how a finding of
vagueness will affect the rights of others. The conclusion of some
courts that the determination of the vagueness question is a matter of
balancing the parents' and child's rights is erroneous. These cases are
not adjudications of the interplay between the constitutional rights of
the parents and the welfare interests of the child. The best approach
for determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the parents is not to consider directly the welfare interests of
the child. The determination of whether certain words have a common
meaning does not in any logical sense depend upon the interests of
those who may be affected by the determination.
In the long run, this approach may best serve the interests of parents and children alike. The courts seem to ignore the fact that a vague
statute may adversely affect the interests of all those involved in its
application. A statute that is vague to the parents is also vague to those
enforcing the statute and the judges and juries deciding the cases. The
children's interests may suffer from a failure to sever the parent-child
relationship in a situation in which the legislature intended that it
should be severed, or from a severance under conditions when such
action was not intended. A more general statute does not, therefore,
necessarily provide assurance that the interests of the child will be pro166
tected. This was the view of Justice Tongue in State v. McMaster:
The positions of plaintiff and defendant are not irreconcilable.
On the contrary, it appears that the best interests of children, parents,
and society not only require, but would be best served by, the implementing of a statute which gives adequate notice to society and adequate guidelines upon which the court can make its decision. Such a
prostatute in no way defeats the ultimate purpose of a termination
167
ceeding-to decide what is in.

.

. the child's best interests.

If a court finds that a termination statute is vague, this determination
should not be altered by a supposed adverse effect on the interests of
the children. Such interests are not at issue in the case and even if they
165. Examples include proper emotional support, intellectual development, and moral super-

vision and guidance.
166. 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971).
167. Id at 317 n.6, 486 P.2d at 579 n.6 (Tongue, J., concurring (quoting defendant)).
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were, they would certainly be better served by a nonvague statute.
V.

CONCLUSION

Determining a constitutional challenge that threatens the operation of a parental termination statute is difficult because of the important rights and interests involved. The parents, those against whom
such statutes are applied, have the right to due process before they can
be deprived of the fundamental right of family integrity. The child,
whose welfare is protected by these statutes, also has important interests in the determination of constitutionality, as does the state, which
has the duty to protect the interests of the child. Courts considering
vagueness challenges to parental termination statutes are thus faced
with several competing interests. The ultimate decision is further complicated by the uncertainties of the vagueness doctrine itself.
As the vagueness doctrine is applied to parental termination statutes, some differences in results may be explained by differences in the
statutes challenged. The decisions of many courts, however, are understandable only in light of the emphasis that the courts give to the various interests involved. The problem is that the interests of the child
have become the center of the courts' attention. Decisions are based
not so much on whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague, but
rather on the assumed consequences if the statute is held to be vague.
The likelihood of courts changing this approach depends on the
success of more specific termination statutes. This success is not likely
to change the focusing by the courts on the interests of the child, but it
may alter the perceived consequences of holding a general standard
unconstitutionally vague. Parents may thus eventually receive greater
protection of their rights. Only a change in the approach of the courts,
however, is likely to result in decisions that will best balance and protect the interests of the parents, the child, and the state.
RichardP. Vornholl

